Introduction
Under notnaal circumstances, I would have allowed Geare (1991) to indulge himself in the erroneous view that the interpretation of the tetna "worker" in the Labour Relations Act 1987 is confined to the common law "· employee". lt is necessary howevẽr, to come out to defend my original thesis (Adzoxomu, 1990 ) that the tetna need not be so narrowly construed. Gẽare seeks to demonstrate, without the relevant historical or policy considerations, and more importantly, without the relevant canons of statutory construction, that his counter thesis is "in fact clearly superior" to mine (p.193) . It is clear from the Geare's commẽnt that he considers modern New Zealand industrial legislation to have preserved the master and servant relationship. The purpose of this reply is to reassert my original thesis that the definition of "worker" in the Labour Relations Act is liberal enough to cover an independent contractor and to demonstrate that the counter thesis of Geare is too conservativẽ to meet the requirements of modern industrial relations. I shall achieve this purpose by addressing Geare's counter thesis under his own subheadings.
Parl. iamentary intent
Geare's frrst argument is that in popular usage, "worker" and "employee" are regarded as "largely" synonymous (p.194) . The fact that he chooses to use the word "largely" mẽans that he recognizes that there is in evẽn popular usage. , a reasonable doubt as to whether the 2 terms are synonymous. This is not all. It is also necessary to point out that we are here, not dealing with the popular usage of the tenns. We are instead dealing with the statutory definitions of the tenus. The popular usagẽ of the tettns have ceased to apply because Parliament has considered it necessary to redefine the tet n1s. There is, therefore, no point in giving · the tenns their popular meanings.
Geare then challenges my observation that P. arliament possesses sufficient sophistication to differẽntiate the one from the other tenn (p.l94). In so doing, he refers to the introduction in 1970 of the personal grievance procedure and claims that the amendment of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1954 intended "wrongful" to mean "unjustifiable" dismissal, but because Parliament was not sufficiently sophisticated, it enacted the fottner instead of the latter te1u1. There are at least 2 serious flaws in the · Geare's example. First, the tertn "wrongful" was not defined in the amending legislation (Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act sl79(l)). It is difficult, if not impossible, to rely on the undefined concept of "wrongful" dismissal to make the point that Parliament did not know what it was doing . . We are fortunate enough to have in the Labour Relations Act and other enacunents the contrasting definitions of "'worker" and
• Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington . Geare does not show anywhere in his comment that I have interpreted the union membership provisions of the Act incorrectly. He cannot do this because he is aware that no eligibility qualification, apart from the requirement that a person should be working or should intend to work, have been imposed under the Act on potential trade union members. Unless he can construe "work" or "working" to mean work or working under a contract of service, he will not have any case.
Geare is also aware of the unfettered discretion conferred on unions to fotinulate their own membership · clauses. As a result he does not challenge my interpretation of this discretion. Instead of so doing, he reacts back to the definition of "worker" and observes that it is not defined as "any one covered by a union's membership clause" (p.195). Obvious again is the desperate effort to fedeem the employee who, for all these years has sold his or her birthright to the statutory worker.
S. Interpretation
There are serious credibility gaps in Geare's exercise in statutory interpretation. According to Geare, "the fact [the definition of 'worker'] refers to a person being 'employed' is suggestive of a contract of service only, given that popular usage refers to 'engaging' a contractor ... " (p.195-196) . The CoUins Eng. lish Dictionary (1985) defines "employ" as "to ẽngage or make use of the , services of (a person) in return for money; hire; to provide work or occupation for; keep busy; occupy". The same source defines "engage" as "to secure the services of; employ". The Concise Oxford Dictionary (1976) also defines "e. mployee" as: "use services of (person); keep (person) in one's service; busy, keep occupied .... " The latter source also defines "engage" as: "bind by contract ... ; hifie (servant, employee)". · Therẽ does not appear to be any difference in the ordinary meanings of the 2 te1n1s. It is, therefore. , suggested that Gcafe is not correct in his observation that one cannot "employ" an independent contractor. An independent contractor may be "employed" or "'engaged" as much . as the common law ẽmployee under section 2 of the Labour Relations Act. Clear words will be necessary to exclude an independent contractor from being "employed" for hire or reward.
Geare also seeks to preserve his narrow definition of "worker" by an appeal to the exclus.io unius est exclusio alterius rule of statutory construction (p.196) . The authorities will, however, indicate that the attempts here are, if anything, an abuse of this residual rule of construction. The Labour Relations . Act defines worker to . . . include" a homeworker. The ordinary understanding, whenever "include" is used is that the categories which follow arẽ only examples of what is intended or envisaged (Maxwe/1,1969, p.270-271) .
One might wish to contrast the Chanc, ery Tavern Ltd easel with Thorby.2 In the former, Palmer J made an order for the "limited reinstatement" of a worker-grievant apparently on the basis that section 227(a) of the Labour Relations Act confers jurisdiction on the Court by virtue of the word "including", to create other fauns of reinstatemẽnt beside those expressly mentioned in the subsection. In the latter case, how, ever, the Arbitration Court considered that there was no scope in section 117(7) of the Industrial Relations Act 1973 for a grievance committee to order a worker's reinstatement to a position which involved less hours of work. This was so because the latter subsection expressly mentioned only 2 forms of reinstatement 1 [1988) It will make no difference whether the word "include", "including" or "includes" is used in the interpretation provision of an Act. As I .angan (1969, p.270) observes:
[T]he word "include" is used "in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural impor~ but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they should include". In other words, the word in respect of which "includes" is used bears both its extended statutory meaning and "its ordinary, popular, and natural sense whenever that would be properly applicable.
Geare might wish to reconsider his argument in this context.
Conclusion
It will now be obvious that Geare has no solid contribution to make to the debate whether "worker" in the Labour Relations Act means only a person who works under a contract of service or whether it means also a person who works under a conttact for services. I still maintain that Parliament has made its intention explicit enough that "worker" is not necessarily confined to the common law employee. The argument that I am incorrect to so assert because Parliament has not changed the definition of "worker" . for nearly 100 years, may be countered in 2 ways. The frrst is that, so far, the claims before our industrial tribunals have not been whether the definition of worker can be extended to also an independent contractor. All the claims have been whether a person works or worked under a contract of service. One must admit that claimants themselves have not directed their attention to the liberal definition of the tetnl. The second is that academic writers such as Geare (1988, p.65-66) have failed to point out that the defmition is liberal enough to cover the independent contractor. One cannot explain this failure in any real tetins; however, it has succeeded in misleading everybody including judges of industrial tribunals. Put together, these 2 reasons would explain why Parliament has never had the opportunity to review the application of the defmition to actual industrial relations practice. It is, however, necessary to point out that this parliamentary inertia cannot serve as an Ark of Israel for Geare's counter thesis. The fact that a particular law has not been changed for 2,000 years is no concrete proof that the law has been applied correctly for all those years.
